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Abstract—Tensor operations, such as matrix multiplication,
are central to large-scale machine learning applications. For
user-driven tasks these operations can be carried out on a
distributed computing platform with a master server at the user
side and multiple workers in the cloud operating in parallel. For
distributed platforms, it has been recently shown that coding over
the input data matrices can reduce the computational delay, yield-
ing a trade-off between recovery threshold and communication
load. In this paper we impose an additional security constraint
on the data matrices and assume that workers can collude to
eavesdrop on the content of these data matrices. Specifically, we
introduce a novel class of secure codes, referred to as secure
generalized PolyDot codes, that generalizes previously published
non-secure versions of these codes for matrix multiplication.
These codes extend the state-of-the-art by allowing a flexible
trade-off between recovery threshold and communication load
for a fixed maximum number of colluding workers.
Index Terms—Coded distributed computation, distributed
learning, secret sharing, information theoretic security.
I. INTRODUCTION
At the core of many signal processing and machine learning
applications are tensor operations such as matrix multiplica-
tions [1]. In the presence of practically sized data sets, such op-
erations are typically carried out using distributed computing
platforms with a master server and multiple workers that can
operate in parallel over distinct parts of the data set. The master
server plays the role of the parameter server, distributing data
to the workers and periodically reconciling their internal state
[2]. Workers are commercial off-the-shelf servers that are
characterized by possible temporary failures and delays [3].
While current distributed computing platforms conventionally
handle straggling servers by means of replication of computing
tasks [4], recent work has shown that encoding the input data
can help reduce the computation latency, which depends on
the number of tolerated stragglers by orders of magnitude, e.g.,
[5], [6]. More generally, coding is able to control the trade-
off between computational delay and communication load
between workers and master server [7]–[11]. Furthermore,
stochastic coding can help keeping both input and output data
secure from the workers, assuming that the latter are honest
by carrying out the prescribed protocol, but curious [12]–[17].
This paper contributes to this line of work by investigating
the trade-off between computational delay and communication
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(grant agreement No 725731) and by U.S. NSF grants CNS-1526547, CCF-
1525629. O. Simeone is currently on leave from NJIT.
load as a function of the privacy level (see Fig. 6 for a
preview).
As illustrated in Fig. 1, we focus on the basic problem of
computing the matrix multiplication C = AB in a distributed
computing system of P workers that can process each only
a fraction 1/m and 1/n of matrices A and B, respectively.
Three performance criteria are of interest: (i) the recovery
threshold PR, that is, the number of workers that need to
complete their task before the master server can recover
the product C; (ii) the communication load CL between
workers and master server; and (iii) the maximum number
PC of colluding servers that ensures perfect secrecy for both
data matrices A and B. In order to put our contribution in
perspective, we briefly review next prior related work.
Consider first solutions that provide no security guarantees,
i.e., PC = 0. As a direct extension of [7], a first approach is to
use product codes that apply separate MDS codes to encode
the two matrices [18]. The recovery threshold of this scheme is
improved by [8] which introduces so called polynomial codes.
The construction in [8] is proved to be optimal under the
assumption that minimal communication is allowed between
workers and master server. In [19] so called MatDot codes are
introduced, resulting in a lower recovery threshold at the ex-
pense of a larger communication load. The construction in [20]
bridges the gap between polynomial and MatDot codes and
presents so called PolyDot codes, yielding a trade-off between
recovery threshold and communication load. An extension
of this scheme, termed Generalized PolyDot (GPD) codes
improves on the recovery threshold of PolyDot codes [21],
which is independently obtained by the construction in [22].
Much less work has been done in the literature if security
constraints are factored in, i.e., if PC 6= 0. In [13] Lagrange
coding is presented which achieves the minimum recovery
threshold for multilinear functions by generalizing MatDot
codes. In [14], [15], [17] a reduction of the communication
load is addressed by extending polynomial codes. While these
works focus on either minimizing recovery threshold or com-
munication load, the trade-off between these two fundamental
quantities has not been addressed in the open literature to the
best of our knowledge. In this paper, we intend to fill this void
and present a novel class of secure computation codes, referred
to as secure GPD (SGPD) codes, that generalize GPD codes
at all communication load levels, yielding a new achievable
trade-off between recovery threshold and communication load
as a function of the desired privacy level.
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Fig. 1: The master server encodes the input matrices A and B and random matrices R and R′, respectively, to define the computational tasks of the slave
servers or workers. The workers may fail or straggle, and they are honest but curious, with colluding subsets of workers of size at most PC . The master
server must be able to decode the product AB from the output of a subset of PR servers, which defines the recovery threshold.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Notation: Throughout the paper, we denote a matrix with
upper boldface letters (e.g., X) and lower boldface letters
indicate a vector or a sequence of matrices (e.g., x). Further-
more, math calligraphic font refers to a set (e.g., X ). A set F
represents the Galois field with cardinality |F|. For any real
number a, dae represents the largest integer nearest to a.
As illustrated in Fig. 1, we consider a distributed computing
system with a master server and P slave servers or workers.
The master server is interested in computing securely the
matrix product C = AB of two data matrices A and
B with dimensions T × S and S × D, respectively. The
matrices have entries from a sufficient large finite field F,
with |F| > P . Both matrices A and B contain confidential
data. The P workers receive information on matrices A and
B from the master; they process this information; and they
respond to the master, which finally recovers the product AB
with minimal computational effort. Each worker can receive
and process only TS/m and SD/n symbols, respectively, for
some integers m and n. The workers are honest but curious.
Accordingly, we impose the secrecy constraint that, even if up
to PC < P workers collude, the workers cannot obtain any
information about both matrices A and B based on the data
received from the master server.
To keep the data secure and to leverage possible computa-
tional redundancy at the workers (namely, if P/m > 1 and/or
P/n > 1), the master server sends encoded versions of the
input matrices to the workers. Due to the above mentioned
communication and storage constraints, the encoded matrices
Ap = fp(A,R), with fp : FTS/m × FTS/m → FTS/m, and
Bp = gp(B,R
′), with gp : FSD/n × FSD/n → FSD/n, to be
sent to each pth worker, p = 1, . . . , P , have TS/m and SD/n
entries, respectively, for some encoding functions fp(·) and
gp(·). The random matrices R and R′ consisting an arbitrary
number of uniform i.i.d. randomly distributed entries from a
field F. The security constraint imposes the condition
I(AP ,BP ;A,B) = 0, (1)
for all subsets of P ⊂ [1, P ] of PC workers, where the random
matrices R and R′ serve as a form of random keys in order
to meet the security constraint (1) [23].
Each worker p computes the product Cp = ApBp of the
encoded sub-matrices Ap and Bp. The master server collects a
subset of PR ≤ P outputs from the workers as defined by the
subset {Cp}p∈PR with |PR| = PR. It then applies a decoding
function h ({Cp}p∈PR), h : FTD/td × · · · × FTD/td︸ ︷︷ ︸
PR times
→ FTD.
Correct decoding translates into the condition
H(AB|{Cp}p∈PR) = 0. (2)
For given parameters m and n, the performance of a coding
and decoding scheme is measured by the triple (PC , PR, CL),
where PC is the maximum number of colluding workers;
PR is the recovery threshold, i.e., the minimum number of
workers whose outputs are used by the master to recover the
product AB; and CL is the communication load defined as
CL =
∑
p∈PR |Cp|. Here, |Cp| is the dimension of the product
matrix Cp computed by worker p. Note that condition (2)
requires the inequality min{PR/m,PR/n} ≥ 1 or PR ≥
PR,min
∆
= max{m,n}, which is hence a lower bound for the
minimum recovery threshold. Furthermore, the communication
load is lower bounded by CL ≥ CL,min ∆= TD, which is the
size of the product C = AB.
A. Generalized PolyDot Code without Security Constraint
In this subsection, we review the GPD construction first
proposed in [19] and later improved in [21], [22]. This coding
scheme achieves the best currently known trade-off between
recovery threshold PR and communication load CL for PC =
0, i.e., under no security constraint. The equivalent entangled
polynomial codes of [22] have the same properties in terms
of (PR, PC). The GPD codes for PC = 0 also achieve the
optimal recovery threshold among all linear coding strategies
in the cases of t = 1 or d = 1, also they minimize the recovery
threshold for the minimum communication load CL,min [8],
[22].
The GPD code splits the data matrices A and B both
horizontally and vertically as
A =
 A1,1 . . . A1,s... . . . ...
At,1 . . . At,s
 , B =
 B1,1 . . . B1,d... . . . ...
Bs,1 . . . Bs,d
 .
(3)
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Fig. 2: Construction of the time sequences a and b used to define the generalized PolyDot (GPD) code. The zero dash line in b indicates all-zero block
sequences. Each solid arrows in a and b shows a distinct row of A and a column of B, respectively.
The parameters s, t, and d can be set arbitrarily under the
constraints m = ts and n = sd. Note that polynomial codes
set s = 1, while MatDot codes have t = d = 1 [20]. All sub-
matrices Aij and Bkl have dimensions T/t×S/s and S/s×
D/d, respectively. The GPD code computes each block (i, j)
of the product C = AB, namely Ci,j =
∑s
k=1Ai,kBk,j , for
i = 1, . . . , t and j = 1, . . . , d, in a distributed fashion. This
is done by means of polynomial encoding and polynomial
interpolation. As we review next, the computation of block
Ci,j can be interpreted as the evaluation of the middle sample
of the convolution ci,j = ai ∗bj between the block sequences
ai = [Ai,1, . . . ,Ai,s] and bj = [Bs,j , . . . ,B1,j ]. In fact,
the sth sample of the block sequence ci,j equals Ci,j , i.e.,
[ci,j ]s = Ci,j . The computation is carried out distributively in
the frequency, domain by using z-transforms with different
workers being assigned distinct samples in the frequency
domain.
To elaborate, define the block sequence a obtained by
concatenating the block sequences ai as a = {a1,a2, . . . ,at}.
Pictorially, a sequence a is obtained from the matrix A by
reading the blocks in the left-to-right top-to-bottom order,
as seen in Fig. 2. We also introduce the longer time block
sequence b as
b = {b1,0,b2,0, . . . ,bd}, (4)
with 0 being a block sequence of s(t∗ − 1) all-zero block
matrices with dimensions S/s×D/d. The sequence b can be
obtained from matrix B by following the bottom-to-top left-
to-right order shown in Fig. 2 and by adding the all-zero block
sequences between any two columns of the matrix B.
In the frequency domain, the z-transforms of sequences a
and b are obtained as
Fa(z) =
ts−1∑
r=0
[a]r+1z
r =
t∑
i=1
s∑
j=1
Ai,jz
s(i−1)+j−1, (5)
Fb(z) =
s−1+ts(d−1)∑
r=0
[b]r+1z
r =
s∑
k=1
d∑
l=1
Bk,lz
s−k+ts(l−1),
(6)
respectively. The master server evaluates the polynomials
Fa(z) and Fb(z) in P non-zero distinct points z1, . . . zP ∈
F and sends the corresponding linearly encoded matrices
Ap = Fa(zp) and Bp = Fb(zp) to server p. The encoding
functions are hence given by the polynomial evaluations (5)
and (6), for z1, . . . , zp. Server p computes the multiplication
Fa(zp)Fb(zp) and sends it to the master server. The master
server computes the inverse z-transform for the received
products {ApBp}p∈PR = {Fa(zp)Fb(zp)}p∈PR , obtaining
the convolution a ∗ b. From the convolution a ∗ b, we can
see that the master server is able to compute all the desired
blocks Ci,j by reading the middle samples of the convolutions
ci,j = ai ∗ bj from samples of the sequence c = a ∗ b
in the order [c]s−1 = C1,1, [c]2s−1 = C2,1, . . . , [c]ts−1 =
Ct,1, [c]s−1+t∗s = C1,2, . . . , [c]ts−1+t∗s = Ct,2, . . . (see
also the Appendix for details). Note that, in particular, the
zero block subsequences added to sequence b ensure that
no interference from the other convolutions, ci′,j′ affects the
middle (sth) sample of a convolution ci,j with i′ 6= i and
j′ 6= j. To carry out the inverse transform, the master server
needs to collect as many values Fa(zp)Fb(zp) as there are
samples of the sequence a∗b, yielding the recovery threshold
PR = tsd + s− 1. (7)
Equivalently, in terms of the underlying polynomial interpre-
tation, the master server needs to collect a number of evalu-
ations of the polynomial Fa(z)Fb(z) equal to the degree of
Fa(z)Fb(z) plus one. This computation is of complexity order
O(TDPR log2(PR)) [20]. Furthermore, the communication
load is given as
CL = PR
TD
td
, (8)
where TD/(td) is the size of each matrix Fa(z)Fb(z).
III. SECURE POLYDOT CODE
In this section, we propose a novel extension of the GPD
code that is able to ensure the secrecy constraint for any
PC < P . We also derive the corresponding achievable set
of triples (PC , PR, CL). As we will see, the projection of this
set onto the plane defined by the condition PC = 0 includes
the set of pairs (PR, CL) in (7) and (8) obtained by the GPD
code [21]. The proposed secure GPD code (SGPD) augments
matrices A and B by adding PC random block matrices to the
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Fig. 3: Construction of the time block sequences a∗ = [a, r] and b∗ = [b, r′] in (12) and (13) used to define the SGPD code for the case s < t. The zero
dashed line in b and r′ indicate all-zero block sequences.
input matrices A and B, in a manner similar to prior works
[12]–[15], [17], yielding augmented matrices A∗ and B∗. As
we will see, a direct application of the GPD codes to these
matrices is suboptimal.
In contrast, we propose a novel way to construct sequences
a∗ and b∗ from matrices A∗ and B∗ that enables the definition
of a more efficient code by means of the z-transform approach
discussed in the previous section. To this end, we follow the
design criterion of decreasing the recovery threshold PR for
a given communication load CL. Based on the discussion in
the previous section, this goal can be realized by decreasing
the length of sequence c∗ = a∗ ∗ b∗, which can in turn be
ensured by reducing the length of the sequence b∗ for a given
length of sequence a∗. We accomplish this objective by (i)
adaptively appending rows or columns with random elements
to matrix A, and, correspondingly columns or rows to B,
which can reduce the recovery threshold; and (ii) modifying
the zero padding procedure (see Fig. 2) for the construction
of sequence b∗. In order to account for point (i), we consider
separately the two cases s < t and s ≥ t.
Note that the code Cc associated with Fa(z)Fb(z) is
obtained as the star product of the codes described by Fa(z)
and Fb(z) [24], and therefore our proposed SGPD scheme
can be interpreted as a secret sharing scheme [23] employing
the star product code Cc.
A. Secure Generalized PolyDot Code: The s < t Case
As illustrated in Fig. 3, when s < t, we augment input
matrices A and B by adding
∆PC
∆
=
⌈
PC
s
⌉
, (9)
random row and column blocks to matrices A and B, respec-
tively. Accordingly, the t∗ × s augmented block matrix A∗
with t∗ = t + ∆PC , is obtained as
A∗ =
[
A
R
]
=

A1,1 . . . A1,s
...
. . .
...
At,1 . . . At,s
R1,1 . . . R1,s
...
. . .
...
R∆PC,1 . . . R∆PC,s

, (10)
while the s × d∗ augmented matrix B∗ = [B R′] with d∗ =
d + ∆PC is obtained as
B∗ =
 B1,1 . . . B1,d R
′
s,1 . . . R
′
s,∆PC
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
Bs,1 . . . Bs,d R
′
1,1 . . . R
′
1,∆PC
 . (11)
In (10) and (11), if s divides PC , all block matrices Rij ∈
FTt ×Ss and R′ij ∈ F
S
s×Dd are generated with i.i.d. uniform
random elements in F. Otherwise, if ∆PC − PC/s > 0, the
last s∆PC −PC matrices in (10), with right-to-left ordering in
the last row of Rij , and in (11) with top-to-bottom ordering
in the last column of R′ij , are all-zero block matrices.
As illustrated in Fig. 3, in the SGPD scheme, the block
sequence a∗ is defined in the same way as in the conventional
GPD, yielding
a∗ = {a1, . . . ,at, r1, . . . , r∆PC }, (12)
where ri is the ith row of the block matrix R, i = 1, . . . ,∆PC .
We also define the time block sequence b∗ = {b, r′} as
b∗ = {b1,0,b2,0, . . . ,bd,0, r′1, r′2, . . . , r′∆PC }, (13)
where 0 is block sequences of s(t∗−1) all-zero block matrices,
respectively, with dimensions S/s×D/d, while r′j is the jth
column of the random matrix R′. The key novel idea of this
construction is that no zero matrices are introduced between
columns of matrix R′. As shown in Theorem 1 below, this
construction allows the master server to recover all the desired
submatrices Ci,j for i = 1, . . . , t and j = 1, . . . , d from the
middle samples of the convolutions ci,j = ai ∗bj (see Fig. 5
for an illustration).
Theorem 1. For a given security level PC < P , the proposed
SGPD code achieves the recovery threshold PRtsd + s− 1, if PC = 0,t∗s(d + 1) + s∆PC − 1, if PC ≥ 1 and ∆PC = PCs ,
t∗s(d + 1)− s∆PC + 2PC − 1, if PC ≥ 1 and ∆PC > PCs ,
(14)
and the communication load (8), where t∗ = t + ∆PC and
d∗ = d + ∆PC for any integer values t, s, and d such that
s < t, m = ts, and n = sd.
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Fig. 4: Construction of the time block sequences a∗ and b∗ in (19) and (20) used to define the SGPD code for the case s ≥ t. The solid line and the zero
dashed line in b∗ indicate columns of B∗ and all-zero block sequences, respectively.
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix A.
Remark 1. When PC ≥ 1 a direct application of the GPD
construction in Fig. 2 would yield the larger recovery threshold
PR =
{
t∗sd∗ + s− 1, if ∆PC = PCs ,
dst∗ + s− 1− 2(s∆PC − PC), if ∆PC > PCs .
(15)
B. Secure Generalized PolyDot Code: The s ≥ t Case
As illustrated in Fig. 4, when s ≥ t, we instead augment
input matrices A and B by adding
∆′PC
∆
=
⌈
PC
min {t, d}
⌉
. (16)
column and row blocks to matrices A and B. This can be seen
to yield a smaller recovery threshold. Accordingly, the t× s∗
augmented block matrix A∗ = [A R] with s∗ = s+ ∆′PC , is
obtained as
A∗ =
 A1,1 . . . A1,s R1,1 . . . R1,∆
′
PC
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
At,1 . . . At,s Rt,1 . . . Rt,∆′PC
 , (17)
while the s∗ × d augmented block matrix B∗ is defined as
B∗ =
[
R′
B
]
=

R′∆′PC,1
. . . R′∆′PC,d
...
. . .
...
R′1,1 . . . R
′
1,d
B1,1 . . . B1,d
...
. . .
...
Bs,1 . . . Bs,d

. (18)
As for (17) and (18), if ∆′PC − PC/min{t, d} > 0, the last
s∆′PC−PC block matrices in (17), with bottom-to-top right-to-
left ordering in R, and in (18) with right-to-left top-to-bottom
ordering in R′, are all-zero block matrices. The construction
of sequences a∗ and b∗ is analogous to the GPD in the non-
secure case. In particular, as seen in Fig. 4, the time block
sequence a∗ is
a∗ = {a1, r1,a2, r2, . . . ,ad, rd}, (19)
whereas the block sequence b∗ is defined as
b∗ = {b1, r′1,0,b2, r′2,0, . . . ,bd, r′d}. (20)
Here, 0 is a block sequence of (t−1)s∗ all-zero block matrices
with dimensions S/s×D/d.
Theorem 2. For a given security level PC < P , the proposed
SGPD code achieves the recovery threshold
PR =
{
s∗(t2 + 1)− 3, if ∆′PC > PCs and t = d
tds∗ + s∗ − 1, otherwise, (21)
and the communication load (8), where s∗ = s + ∆′PC for
any integer values t, s, and d such that s ≥ t, m = ts, and
n = sd.
Proof. The proof is presented in Appendix B.
Example 1. We now provide some numerical results of the
proposed SGPD. We set P = 3000 and m = n = 36.
The trade-off between communication load CL and recovery
threshold PR for both non-secure conventional GPD codes
(PC = 0) and proposed SGPD code with PC = 11 and
PC = 29 is illustrated in Fig. 6. The figure quantifies the
loss in terms of achievable pairs (PR, CL) that is caused by
the security constraint. We also show the performance of the
recently proposed GASPsmall scheme in [17], for PC = 0,
PC = 11, and PC = 29.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
To this best of the authors’ knowledge, this work presents
the best currently known trade-off curve between communica-
tion load and recovery threshold as a function of the desired
input privacy level for the problem of distributed matrix
multiplication. The main result recovers prior art, including
[19]–[21]. Among topics for future work, we mention here
the establishment of matching converse bounds [16] and the
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Fig. 5: Illustration of correct recovery threshold for t = 3, s = 2, d = 2, and
PC = 2. Dashed blue stems with filled markers represent the convolution c∗.
Individual convolutions ci,j are shown in different colors with square markers.
Contributions from one or both random matrices are show as red crosses. The
desired submatricesCi,j are seen to equal the corresponding samples from the
sequence c∗, associated with the center points of the individual convolutions.
consideration of impairments in the communication channel
between workers [25].
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The z-transform of sequences a∗ and b∗ are given respec-
tively as
Fa∗(z) =
t∑
i=1
s∑
j=1
A∗i,jz
s(i−1)+(j−1)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆
= F1(z)
+
t∗∑
i=t+1
s∑
j=1
A∗i,jz
s(i−1)+j−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆
= F2(z)
, (22)
Fb∗(z) =
s∑
k=1
d∑
l=1
B∗k,lz
s−k+t∗s(l−1)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆
= F3(z)
+
s∑
k=1
d∗∑
l=d+1
B∗k,lz
t∗sd+s(l−d)−k
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆
= F4(z)
. (23)
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Fig. 6: Communication load CL versus recovery threshold PR for both non-
secure generalized PolyDot (GPD) and secure generalized PolyDot (SGPD)
codes when P = 3000 and m = n = 36. The performance for GASPsmall
codes [17] is shown for PC = 0 and PC = 11. For PC = 29 they achieve
CL = 2.8, PR = 36291 (not shown).
The master server evaluates Fa∗(z) and Fb∗(z) at P non-
zero distinct points z1, . . . , zP ∈ F, which define the encoding
functions, and sends both matrices Ap = Fa∗(zp) and Bp =
Fb∗(zp) to worker p. Worker p performs the multiplication
Fa∗(zp)Fb∗(zp), and sends the results back to the master
server. To reconstruct all blocks Ci,j of matrix C = AB, the
master server carries out polynomial interpolation, or equiv-
alently it computes the inverse z-transform, upon receiving a
number of multiplication results equal to at least the length of
the sequence c∗ = a∗ ∗b∗. As we detail next, the (i, l) block
Ci,l =
∑s
r=1Ai,rBr,l, for all i = 1, . . . , t and l = 1, . . . , d, of
matrix C = AB can be seen equal to the (si−1+(l−1)t∗s)th
sample of the convolution c∗ = a∗ ∗ b∗. An illustration can
be found in Fig. 5.
To see this, we first note that, by the properties of
GPD codes, matrix Ci,l is the coefficient of the monomial
zsi−1+(l−1)t
∗s in F1(z)F3(z). Note that this holds since
the polynomial F1(z) and F3(z) are defined as for GPD
codes. We now need to show that no other contribution to
this term arises from the products F1(z)F4(z), F2(z)F3(z),
and F2(z)F4(z). The terms in the product F1(z)F4(z) have
exponents (t∗sd + s(i − 1) + s(l − d) − 1), for i = 1, . . . , t
and l = d+1, . . . , d∗, which do not include the desired values
(si − 1 + (l − 1)t∗s) for i = 1, . . . , t and l = 1, . . . , d. A
similar discussion applies to the product F2(z)F3(z), whose
exponents are (s(i + t∗l − t∗) − 1), for i = t + 1, . . . , t∗
and l = 1, . . . , d, and F2(z)F4(z), whose exponents are
(t∗sd + s(i − 1) + s(l − d) − 1), for i = t + 1, . . . , t∗ and
l = d + 1, . . . , d∗.
In order to recover the convolution c∗, the master server
needs to collect a number of values of the product Fa(z)Fb(z)
equal to the length of the sequence c∗, which can be computed
as the degree deg (Fa(z)Fb(z))+1, where deg(Fa(z)Fb(z))
is
{
t∗s(d + 1) + s∆PC − 1, if ∆PC = PCs ,
dst∗ − s∆PC + 2PC + t− 2, if ∆PC > PCs ,
(24)
which for PC ≥ 1 implies the recovery threshold PR in (14).
The communication load CL in (8) follows from the fact that
there are TD/(td) entries in Fa∗(zp)Fb∗(zp), for all p ∈
[1, PR].
The security constraint (1) can be proved in a manner
similar to [14] by the following steps:
I(A,B;AP ,BP)
=H(AP ,BP)−H(AP ,BP |A,B)
(a)
=H(AP ,BP)−H(AP ,BP |A,B)
+ H(AP ,BP |A,B,R1, . . . ,RPC ,R′1, . . . ,R′PC )
=H(AP ,BP)− I(AP ,BP ;R1, . . . ,RPC ,R′1, . . . ,R′PC |A,B)
=H(AP ,BP)−H(R1, . . . ,RPC ,R′1, . . . ,R′PC |A,B)
+ H(R1, . . . ,RPC ,R
′
1, . . . ,R
′
PC |A,B,AP ,BP)
(b)
=H(AP ,Bp)−H(R1, . . . ,RPC ,R′1, . . . ,R′PC )
(c)
≤H(AP) + H(BP)−
PC∑
p=1
H(Rp)−
PC∑
p=1
H(R′p)
(d)
=H(AP) + H(BP)− PC TS
m
log |F| − PC SD
n
log |F|
(e)
≤
PC∑
p=1
H(Ap) +
PC∑
p=1
H(Bp)− PC TS
m
log |F| − PC SD
n
log |F|
(f)
=PC
TS
m
log |F|+ PC SD
n
log |F| − PC TS
m
log |F|
− PC SD
n
log |F|
=0, (25)
where (a) follows from the definition of encoding functions,
since AP is a deterministic function of A and Rp and BP
is a deterministic function of B and R′p, respectively, for all
p = 1, . . . , PC ; (b) follows from (22) and (23), since from
PR polynomial evaluations AP and BP in (22) and (23)
we can recover 2PC unknowns when the coefficients Ai,j
and Bk,l are known, given that we have PR ≥ 2PC ; (c)
and (d) follow since Rp and R′p are independent uniformly
distributed entries; (e) follows by upper bounding the joint
entropy using the sum of individual entropies; and (f) follows
from an argument similar to (d). Hence, the proposed scheme
is information-theoretically secure.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
We define the z-transform of sequences a∗ and b∗ respec-
tively as
Fa∗(z) =
t∑
i=1
s∑
j=1
A∗i,jz
s∗(i−1)+j−1
+
t∑
i=1
s∗∑
j=s+1
A∗i,jz
s∗(i−1)+j−1, (26)
Fb∗(z) =
s∗∑
k=1+∆′PC
d∑
l=1
B∗k,lz
s∗−k+ts∗(l−1)
+
∆′PC∑
k=1
d∑
l=1
B∗k,lz
s∗−k+ts∗(l−1). (27)
The (i, l) block Ci,l =
∑s
r=1Ai,rBr,l, for all i = 1, . . . , t
and l = 1, . . . , d, of matrix C = AB can be seen equal to the
(s∗i−1+(l−1)ts∗)th sample of the convolution c∗ = a∗∗b∗.
The rest of the proof follows in a manner akin to Theorem 1.
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